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[So F. No. 19704. In Bank.

Oct. 1, 1958.]

MARTHA MITCHELL et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Witneases - Privileged OommunicatioDS - Public O1Iicers.-A
defendant is entitled at his .trial to_~l!.certain on !lro~a
tion the name of an informer JV:bo ~ a material witneSs on
the issue of guilt.
[8] Iel. - Privileged OommuDicatioDS - Public O1Iicers.-The rea,
80~S that require disclosure of au informer at· the--tnal--mso reqUire disclosDre..at.1h.e preliminary hear~~ce defendant
~as the right. at. suc~~aring to cross-examine the prosecu_tion's witnesses (Pen. Code, § ~1!1)1_and produce witnesses in
. his own behalf (Pen. Code, I§ 864,866).
IS] b.olu"bitiQIt: Appli@tioJl. of _ ltules-Oriminal ProceedingsPreljmjnaTJ' Hearing. Prohibition does not lie to review iUlings ~f the magistrate on the admissib~ity of evidence a~ the

[1] See Oa1.J'ur•• Witnesses, 131; Am.Jur.. Witnesses, 11535,
536.
MeX. Dil. References: [1, 2,4] Witnesses, § 60; [3,5] Prohibition,l43.
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preliminary hearing unless the commitment is u ................,
on incompetent evidence.
[4] Witnesses-Privileged Oommunications-Public otIlcelr8.--TlIul
value to defendants of disclosure of the names of inf'OrllllU.···'!.l
at the preliminary hearing is that it might enable them'
obtain information useful in their defense . at..the trial ; i~
not be presumed that the superior court willerroneoua4'
disclosure at the trial or fail to grant a continuance if
necessary to enable 'defendants to locate and int.erview
informers in the preparation of their defense.
[6] Prohibition - Application of Bules - Oriminal PrclceediD,p
Preliminary Hearlni.-.Although the delay inc:ideJlt
tinuance to enable defendants to locate and inte'I"View
formers in the preparation of the defense might
obviated had the magistrate ruled correctly on the adJilliBlsi~
bility of evidence, his erroneous ruling did not
jurisdictional issue such as would authorize a writ of
tion to prevent trial; wh~re _~here was competent eviideJllceJ
justify committing defendants-and-m.sruo8nre'of
the informers could be obtained at the trial, u~~:l;:~~
not prejudiced by the error' -deprived of any
right. (Pen. Code, § 1404.)

or

PROQ~J!1pING in prohibition ,to restrain the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from further
proceedings on certain informations. Writ denied.

Arthur D. Klang for Petitioners.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A.
Assistant Attorney General, William M. Bennett and Arlo
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Informations charged defendants with p0ssession of heroin, two sales of heroin and maintenance of a
place for the sale of narcotics in violation of Health and Safety
Code, sections 11500 and 11557. Their motions to set aside the
informations on the ground that they had not been legally
committed by a magistrate (Pen. Code, § 995) were denied
and they now seek a writ of prohibition t~_p-re,!~nt..their trial.
Evidence at the preliminary hearing showed that police
officers received information from two informers that defendants were selling narcotics in their apartment. The officers searched the two informers and removed all articles
from their clothing. Each of the informers was given $20
in bills dusted with lluorescent powder. The serial numbers
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of the bills were recorded. The officers escorted the informers
to defendants' apartment. The informers entered the apartment separately and in a few minutes. r.etl!!"n!!d sep~rate]y.
They were then searched. The bills were gone and each informer had a bindle of heroin. The Qffi:Gir~ waited--in frout
of the apartment door for about 10 or 15 minutes. Defendant
MitchelLopened the door and was immediately placed under
arrest. She dropped a package of heroin to the fioor. The
officers arrested defendant Flynn in the bedroom and found
four bindles of heroin on his person. The officers found the
bills given to one informer behind one of the dresser drawers,
but they did not find the bills given to the other informer.
There was fluorescent powder on both of Mitchell's hands and
on Flynn's finger tips and shirt. On cross-examination the
magistrate sustained objections to defendants' questions seeking to ascertain the names of the informers.
We have concluded that it was error to deny defendants
disclosure of the names of the two informers at the preliminary hearing on their cross-examination of the officer who
testified to the participation of the informers but that prohibition does not lie to restrain the trial of defendants.
[1] A defendant is entitled at his trial to ascertain on
cross-examination the name of an informer who is a material
witness on the issue of guilt. (People v. McShann, ante, p.
802 [330 P.2d 33]; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App.2d
435, 450-451 [308 P.2d 821].) [2] The reasons that require
disclosure at the trial also require disclosure at the preliminary hearing, for the defendant has the right at such hearing
to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses (Pen. Code,
§ 865) and to produce witnesses in his own behalf (Pen. Code,
§§ 864,866). The exercise of these rights at the preliminary
hearing may enable the defendant to show that there is no
reasonable cause to commit him for trial and thus to avoid the
degradation and expense of a criminal trial.
[3] Prohibition does not lie to review rulings of the magistrate on the admissibility of evidence at the preliminary hearing unless the commitment is based entirely on incompetent
evidence. (Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 3, 7-8 [291
P.2d 929].) Defendants do not contend that as a result of
the magistrate's error there is no competent evidence to support a finding of reasonable cause to commit them for trial.
(Ct. P"iestly v. Superior Court, ante, p. 812 [330 P.2d
39].) It is contended, however, that denial of the right of
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing is not only a
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ruling on the admissibility of evidence but the denial of a eO~J}
stitutional right. It is unnecessary to resolve this contention,;
for there was not such an interference with the right of cross-. :
examination in this case as to justify a writ of prohibition. i
It does not appear that disclosure of the names of the informers was demanded to enable defendants to discredit the
prOsecution's evidence at the preliminary hearing or that they
wished to use the informers as witnesses at that hearing. Indeed, defendants' brief indicates otherwise: "The defendants
did not present a defense other than cross-examination in the
preliminary hearing. They were not required so to do and
this Honorable Court is aware that not only is it rarely done,
but would be a foolbardy thing to do." [4] The value to
defendants of disclosure is that it might enable them to obtain information useful in their defense at the trial. It can- .
not be presumed that the superior court will erroneously·
deny disclosure at the trial or fail to grant a continuance if
it is necessary to enable defendants to locate and interview •
the informers in the preparation of their defense. [6] Although the delay incidept to such a continuance would have
been obviated had the magistrate ruled correctly, his erroneous ruling on the admissibility of evidence does not raise
a jurisdictional issue. (Rogers V. 8uperior C01tri. fttpra. 46
CaI.2d at 6-7.) Since there was competent evidence to justify
committing defendants and disclosure of the names of the informers can be obtained at the trial, defendants were not prejudiced by the error or deprived of any substantial right.
(See Pen. Code, § 1404.)
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., and Schauer, J .• concurred.
CARTER. J.-I concur in the views expressed in the
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor. In Priestly v.
8uperior Court. ante, .p. 812 [330 P.2d 39] I have expressed my views somewhat at length on the right of a defendant in a criminal case to cross-examine a witness on a
material issue.
Defendant contends that the denial of the right of crossexamination in this case was a denial of a constitutional right.
In the Priestly case I concluded that in the preliminary
hearing the accused was denied a constitutional right of a
fair hearing where the magistrate denied him the right of
:-::iJ.

I
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cross-examination on a disputed factual issue and on which
the outcome of the proceedings hinged. The factual issue disputed in the Priestly case was the presence of probable cause
for the arrest and search. In this case defendant does not dispute that there was probable cause for the arrest and seizure,
but only desires to know the informants' identities to better
prepare his defense at the trial. This is precisely what defendant will receive. However, it is readily apparent that
the teStimony of the police officers relating the information
given by the informants is not crucial to the issue of whether
there is any competent evidence to hold defendant. It cannot
be said, therefore, that the denial of defendant's right of
cross-examination amounted t9 a denial of a fair hearing 01'
to deprivation of his liberty without due process of law.
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the order discharging the alternative writ of prohibition and denying a peremptory writ,
for the following reasons:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition restraining
the superior cout:t; from trying petitioners on a charge of
violating section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code (possession of heroin) and section 11557 of the Health and
Safety Code (maintaining a ·place for the sale of narcotics).
At the preliminary examination police officE'rs testified
to being informed by two reliable informantS that pE'titioners
were selling narcotics in their apartment. After stripping
and searching the informants and removing all articles of
their clothing, the oftlcers gave each of .them $20 in bills,
the serial numbers' of which were recorded, and escorted
the informants to petitioners' apartment.
. The bills were dusted with fluorescent powder invisible to
the naked eye. Separately, the informants entered the apartment and in a few minutes returned. They were then
searched. The bills were gone, and each had a bindle of
heroin.
.
The officers then:· waited in front of the apartment door
for approximately 10 or 15 minutes. It was opened by
petitioner Mitchell, who was immediately placed under arrest.
She dropped a package from her hand to the floor, which
paekage contained heroin. In the bedroom they arrested
pl'titioner Flynn. Four bindles were found on his person.
BE'hind one of the dresser drawers the officers found the bills
given to the first informant. They did not find those given
the second informant. With a black box they observed fluor-
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escent powder on both hands of petitioner Mitchell and·on
the fingertips and shirt of petitioner Flynn. On eross:.';
examination the officers refused to divulge the names of the
informant-participants.
Petitioners' 11010 oontention is that the,y were illegally·
committed because the magistrate, during the preliminary
examination, refused to allow them to ask the prosecuting
witnesses the names of the two informant-participants.
Thus the question is presented: Will a writ of proh'ibition

lie to remew the ruling of a committing magistrate upon 1M .~
admission or exclusion of etlidence at a preliminaf1/a;-i
amination'
No. The rule is settled that the sole province of the writ .
of prohibition is to arrest proceedings of a tribunal or pe~
exercising judicial functions when acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction. (40 Cal.Jur.2d (1958), Prohibition,
§ 64, p. 226; Code Civ. Proc., § 1102·; County of 8utter v.
Superior Court, 188 Cal. 292, 295 [4) [204 P. 849) ; Rebstook
v. 8uperior Court, 146 Cal. 308, 310 [80 P. 65).)
.
If the court has jurisdiction over both the crime and the
person of the defendant, prohibition is not available to restrain or correct mere errors in procedure, such as rulings
upon the admissibility of evidence, since such errors can be
corrected on appeal. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal,
17 Ca1.2d 280, 287 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715) ; McGinis
v. Justice', Court, 28 Cal.App. 680, 682 [153 P. 728] ; 8tate
ex reI. PardeevtUe Electric Light Co. v. Sachtjen, 245 Wis. 26
[13 N.W.2d 538] ; 73 C.J.B. (1951), Prohibition, § 12, p. 70.)

In AbeUeira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, a case
involving the question as to the propriety of this court's
issuing a writ of prohibition, it was said at page 286:

"1. 4 Lack of jurisdiction' as a basis for writ of prohibition .
• , The first inquiry in this case must, of course, be as to
the nature and meaning of Cjurisdiction'; and here three
possible sources of confusion must be eliminated.
•, Becond is the nature of a writ of prohibition, which never
issues to restrain a lower tribunal for committing mere error
in deciding a question properly before it. If the lower court
·Section 1102 of the Code of Civil Proced u re reads: "The writ of
prohibition arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
or person exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board
or pe1'llOll."
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has power to make a correct determination of a particular
issue, it clearly has power to make an incorrect decision,
subject only to appellate review and not to restraint by
prohibition. Hence, in examining the authorities, we must
conclude that in those situations ill which a writ of prohibition
was issued, the particular action restrained was one beyond
the jurisdiction of the court to take.' t
The foregoing statement as applicable to the instant ease
may be paraphrased as follows:
"A writ of prohibition never issues to restrain a lower
tribunal from committing mere error in deciding a question
properly before it. The committing magistrate in the present
case had power to make a correct determination of the particular issue presented to it. It clearly had power to make
an incorrect decision, subject only to appellate review and
not to restraint by prohibition. Hence, we must conclude
that in this case a writ of prohibition will not issue because
the particular action attempted to be restrained was one
within the jurisdiction of the committing magistrate."
To the same effect is the holding of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in 8tate ex reI. Pardeeville Electric Light Co. v.
8achtje'TI, supra, where at page 540 the court said: "Petitioner
further contends that certain evidence which it offered on the
trial before Judge Hoppmann was improperly excluded, and
that if the same testimony were offered again, before the present presiding judge, the court might admit same. It is not Ihe

function of a writ of prohibition to determine the admissibility
of evidence on the trial of an action in the circuit court. At
present we are only concerned with the question of the power
and jurisdiction of the sitting judge. The merits of the
litigation are not before us." (Italics added.)
The authority to hear and determine involves the power
to decide incorrectly as well as correctly in a given ease
or controversy within the jurisdiction of the committing
magistrate and does not depend upon the regularity of the
exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the de.
cision there made. A writ of prohibition is not employed
as a means of correcting errors of an inferior tribunal on
matters of procedure where, as in the instant case, such
alleged errors may be reviewed on appeal from an adverse
judgment.
If the rule were otherwise, in every ordinary action a defendant whenever he chose could halt the proceeding in the
trial court by applying for a writ of prohibition to stop the
10 C.Jd-I'I'
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CJrdinary progress of the action toward a judgment until
reviewing tribunal passed upon an intermediate question
that hlln RriRen. If such were the rule, reviewing courts
would in innumerable cases be converted from appellate.
courts to nisi prius tribunals.
It is clear that the committing magistrate had jurisdiction !
over both the crime charged and the persons of petitioners in
the present case. It is likewise evident that there was substantial evidence to support the committing magistrate's finding that there was probable cause to believe that petitioners
were guilty of the offenses with which they were charged.
Supporting this view is the statement in petitioners' brief:
"The defendants did not present a defense other than crossexamination in the preliminary hearing. They were not
required so to do and this Honorable Court is aware that
not only is it rarely done, but would be a foolhardy thing
to do."
Since petitioners' sole contention is directed to an error
in procedure, to wit, improper exclusion of evidence, which I
error under the rule set forth above will not be considered
on a petition for a writ of prohibition, the altemative writ
is properly discharged and the peremptory writ is correctly
denied.
SHENK, J., and SPENCE, J.-We concur in the judgment.

